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Abstract 
 
An extensive literature that examines the relationship between family structure and children’s 
outcomes consistently shows that living with a single parent is associated with negative outcomes. Few 
studies, however, directly test the relationship between family structure and outcomes for the child once 
he/she reaches adulthood. We directly examine, using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, whether family 
structure during childhood is related to the child’s economic wellbeing both during childhood as well as 
adulthood. Our findings suggest that the economic wellbeing of children of mothers who experience a marital 
dissolution and remarry are no different from the children of mothers who are continuously married. 
However, the children of mothers whose marriages dissolve but who do not remarry experience large 
declines in their income over their first ten years of life. We also show that while the children of never 
married mothers earn a lot less as adults than the children of married parents, these differences can largely 
be explained by demographic and socioeconomic factors. Finally, our findings suggest that children who have 
mothers who experience a marital dissolution and who do not remarry have economic losses that persist into 
adulthood. Robustness checks using family fixed effects models support this result. 
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Introduction 
The importance of family structure as it relates to outcomes for U.S. children is one of the 
most frequently investigated topics in the field of social demography. Descriptively, it is 
clear that children who live with married parents fare better in nearly all domains, e.g., 
economically, cognitively, and emotionally, than those with parents who separate or 
divorce during their childhood or who live with a parent who was never married (Amato 
2000; Bjorklund, Ginther, and Sundstrom 2001; Gruber 2004; McLanahan and Sandefur 
1994; Nock 2000; Ribar 2004). These differences persist even after controlling for a variety 
of demographic and socioeconomic factors (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; Ribar 2004). 
Most research to date examines the relationship between family structure and outcomes 
measured during the child’s youth and adolescence, such as educational attainment (e.g., 
Astone and McLanahan 1991, 1994; Biblarz and Raftery 1999; McLanahan and Sandefur 
1994), cognitive test scores (Gennetian 2005) and psychological distress and smoking 
(Ermisch and Francesconi 2001). Many of these outcomes are chosen because they are 
considered indicators of the child’s success as an adult. However, these studies do not 
directly test the relationship between the family structure of a child’s parents during the 
child’s youth and outcomes for the child once he/she reaches adulthood, and there is 
relatively little research on the long-term impacts of family structure (Fronstin, Greenberg, 
and Robins 2001). The contribution of this paper is to examine directly whether the 
economic wellbeing of children during both their youth and in their adulthood is related to 
their family structure during their formative years. Single parenthood might alter the 
financial wellbeing of a child’s family, which, in turn, could potentially reduce the human 
capital accumulation of the child and his/her financial success as an adult and a parent.  
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Ultimately then, family structure may play a large role in the economic success of a family 
across generations. 
This paper adds to extant literature on family structure and children’s outcomes in 
the United States in several important ways. First, we use a data source, the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), that allows us to link the resources available to a child while 
growing up to the economic success of the same child once he/she becomes an adult. As 
mentioned earlier, nearly all of the previous work in this area investigated family structure 
and outcomes for children while they were young or during adolescence as these outcomes 
had less strenuous data requirements. It is only now that a single data source with 
information on family structure over several decades exists; one that allows an inquiry into 
economic wellbeing in both the child’s youth and adulthood. Second, much of the previous 
literature on family structure and children’s outcomes was based on the living 
arrangements of the child during a particular year of the child’s life.  For example, in their 
classic study, McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) define the family structure for the child 
based on the mother’s marital status in the child’s 16th year. Wolfe et al. (1996) 
demonstrate that choosing a single point in time to capture family circumstances often 
produces misleading results. In this study, we create a family structure history for each 
child from birth through the year of their 10th birthday. While we follow McLanahan and 
Sandefur and define single parenthood as living with a divorced, separated, never married, 
or widowed mother, we do not base our classification on one year of the child’s life. 
Instead, we use the entire 10-year interval to determine if the child grew up with a single 
mother. Thus, we are much more likely to classify children as living with an ever-divorced 
mother, for example, than we would using a single year of data. 
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There are several well-known limitations to the literature on family structure and 
children’s outcomes. Family structure is not randomly assigned; therefore, it is 
extraordinarily difficult to establish causal estimates of the impact of single parenthood. In 
addition to capturing causal impacts, statistical associations between family structure and 
children’s outcomes could easily result from reverse causality, also frequently called 
simultaneity. These associations also potentially contain bias generated by omitted 
variables (Bjorkland, Ginther, and Sundstrom 2007; Ribar 2004). Simultaneity bias exists 
because many estimates of the relationship between family structure and an outcome, 
particularly cross-sectional estimates, potentially include the outcome’s effect on family 
structure. In addition, it has been well-established that single parenthood is associated 
with a number of characteristics that might affect family income. If one fails to account for 
these omitted variables, then estimates of the effect of family structure will also include the 
indirect effect of family structure that operates through these omitted variables. These 
problems rightly leave the literature on family structure and children’s outcomes 
vulnerable to criticisms that the estimates are biased. Without a controlled experiment that 
randomly assigns family structure, establishing causal estimates is exceedingly difficult.   
We also can be questioned on whether our estimates truly capture single 
parenthood’s effect on family income (i.e., a causal impact) because of simultaneity and 
omitted variable bias. However, we take several steps to address these issues, largely by 
taking advantage of the information we have over nearly four decades. We use a difference 
model to remove the bias created by time-invariant omitted variables correlated with 
family structure and family income during the parents’ generation. We also benefit from 
estimating the importance of family structure several decades before the child’s adult 
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income is measured reducing concerns for simultaneity bias. In addition, we use family 
fixed effects to test the robustness of our findings for the relationship between family 
structure and the child’s economic success as an adult.  
While the econometric challenges that have only been partially addressed in the 
literature are important to document so as to improve our current understanding of the 
issue, it is equally important to note that policymakers in the United States continue to 
place great emphasis on marriage, particularly for the low-income population.  One can see 
this in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program where the goals 
include promoting healthy marriages and discouraging out-of-wedlock pregnancies. 
Arizona, Arkansas, and Louisiana have implemented laws that create a covenant marriage 
option for couples. Covenant marriages require counseling before a couple can divorce and 
a no-fault declaration is not an option for dissolution. Thus, while it can be difficult to 
generate causal estimates of the impact of family structure on children’s outcomes, it 
remains an important social policy topic and is, therefore, worthy of more scholarly 
attention. 
We contribute several findings to the research literature. First, we find that marital 
dissolution in and of itself does not reduce the economic resources available to children. 
Instead, we find that those who remarry after dissolution are not different in terms of their 
mean income over the first ten years of a child’s life from those who are always married. 
The children of parents whose marriages dissolve and who do not remarry, however, 
experience large declines in their mean income over the first ten years of a child’s life. 
Second, we show that while the children of never married mothers earn a lot less as adults 
than the children of married parents, these differences can largely be explained by 
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demographic and socioeconomic factors. Third, our findings suggest that children who 
have parents who experience a marital dissolution in the first ten years of their life earn 
less income in their adulthoods. Robustness checks using family fixed effects models are 
consistent with this result. 
 
Theory 
There are a number of reasons living with a single parent might harm the economic 
wellbeing of children. Many of the long-term economic effects of family structure operate 
by reducing the child’s human capital accumulation, which would reduce the child’s 
productivity as an adult (Becker 1993). Perhaps the most straightforward explanation 
involves the differences in resources provided by two parents compared to one. Two 
parents likely have more time in a day to distribute between participation in the labor force 
and the supervision of children. We know that married parents have higher average family 
incomes than single parents (Duncan and Hoffman 1985; Fronstin, Greenberg, and Robins 
2001; Ribar 2004). All else equal, this would allow for greater investments in schooling, 
educational technology, and extracurricular lessons, among many other things and this 
should ultimately translate into a higher standard of living for the child (Becker 1991; 
Becker and Tomes 1986).  Furthermore, married parents should have more time (between 
the two of them) to spend with their children than single parents, all else equal (Fronstin, 
Greenberg, and Robins 2001). Economic models of specialization suggest that two parents 
can capitalize on their comparative advantages and create greater productivity than could 
a single parent (Becker 1991). Two parents co-residing also experience economies of scale. 
The couple can pool their resources and can share the cost of housing, appliances, and 
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many of other expenditures that do not need to be duplicated for a family (McLanahan and 
Sandefur 1994; Ribar 2004).  Furthermore, should a couple split, women and children tend 
to receive less than their proportionate share of the couple’s pooled resources.  In other 
words, a mother and a child usually have to live on less than two-thirds of the pooled 
resources available to the family (of three) (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994). This 
reduction in resources may translate into lower levels of parental investment in the child’s 
human capital as the custodial parent must split her time between the labor force and 
home production (Fronstin, Greenberg, and Robins 2001). 
Divorce, separation, or the death of a spouse can produce inordinate amounts of 
stress that might harm the child’s economic wellbeing (Amato 2000; Fronstin, Greenberg, 
and Robins 2001). Because a divorce is culmination of a process of marital disintegration 
that can transpire over many years and produces stress throughout that period, it can 
affect the emotional and physical development of children. This stress in turn can disrupt 
their educational attainment and the developmental process (Amato 2000; McLanahan and 
Sandefur 1994). Parents/fathers who do not live in the same household also do not develop 
the same trust levels and commitment to their children (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994). 
Children who reside in single-parent households may also assume adult roles, such as 
providing childcare for younger siblings which could slow human capital accumulation 
(Weiss 1979).  The stresses created by single motherhood, whether it occurs through 
marital dissolution or never having been married, can also strain the mother child 
relationship.  This might lead to inconsistent parenting and may disrupt the natural stages 
children progress through in their development (McLanahan 1988; McLanahan and 
Bumpass 1988).  
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Of course, if children are in a difficult situation at home, for instance, one where 
there is physical or emotional abuse, removing the child from such a circumstance might 
prove beneficial (Amato 2000; Fronstin, Greenberg, and Robins 2001; Gruber 2004). Even 
in households in which abuse is not present, continual marital turmoil can be harmful to 
the child’s emotional wellbeing and create economic effects. It is also true that the 
reduction in resources created when a parent leaves the child’s household is moderated by 
the reduction in their consumption (Fronstin, Greenberg, and Robins 2001). 
 
Literature Review 
While the empirical research on family structure and its effects on children’s outcomes is 
quite large, there are only a handful of studies that investigate the relationship between 
family structure and the child’s outcomes once he/she reaches adulthood, including a few 
international studies. Fronstin, Greenberg, and Robins (2001) use the British National Child 
Development Survey (NCDS) to determine if the divorce or the death of a father affects 
educational attainment, labor force participation, and earnings by age 33. The NCDS is a 
panel data set composed of 98 percent (n=17,414) of all children born in the United 
Kingdom during the first week of March in 1958. Information on the birth cohort was 
collected again when the children were age 7, 11, 16, 23, and 33 (Fronstin, Greenberg, and 
Robins 2001). Their findings suggest that parental divorce or death is associated with a 
reduction in the labor force participation of males and in the wages of females. Parental 
divorce also appears to moderate educational attainment for the British cohort.  
Also using data from the United Kingdom, Ermish and Francesconi (2001) use 
sibling fixed effects model to determine if single parenthood is related to educational 
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attainment, economic inactivity, childbearing at a young age, and smoking. Their data 
source is the 1991 to 1995 waves of the British Household Panel Survey. The authors claim 
that by using sibling comparisons, they remove all endogenous factors constant within the 
family. The authors also use variation with respect to the timing of the single parenthood to 
determine if particular periods during the child’s life cycle are particularly damaging to the 
child’s outcomes. They find that single parenthood is negatively related to educational 
attainment and positively related to smoking. Furthermore, single parenthood during the 
child’s youth appears to be particularly harmful. 
Gruber (2004) is one of a few studies that investigates the long-term economic 
impacts of family structure using data from the United States.  Gruber asks if changes in 
states’ unilateral divorce laws are related to the economic wellbeing of children as adults. 
Unilateral divorce laws allow one party in a marriage to dissolve the marriage without 
asking for the consent of the other spouse, and he finds that children exposed to unilateral 
divorce regimes while growing up have lower levels of education and family income as 
adults. 
In a study similar to this one, Bjorklund, Ginther, and Sundstrom (2007) use both 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 cohort (NLSY) and the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) to estimate the relationship between family structure and 
educational attainment and earnings for American families and a 20 percent random 
sample of individuals born in Sweden in 1964 and 1965, matching them with their siblings.  
Their findings suggest that the children of single parent families have lower educational 
attainment and earnings.  However, once one removes within family variation, the results 
are no longer statistically significant. Unlike our study, they only use one year of earnings, 
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however. In addition, Bjorklund, Ginther, and Sundstrom (2007) measure the amount of 
time in the child’s first 16 years that the child spent in a variety of family structures as their 
independent variables of interest. These family structure measures assume linearity in the 
amount of time spent in the different structures. 
 
Methods 
Data 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) serves as the data source for this analysis.  The 
PSID is a longitudinal data set originally representative of households in the United States 
in 1968, the year the survey started.  From 1968 through 1993, respondents were asked 
demographic and employment questions annually, and since 1993, respondents have been 
interviewed biannually. One of the unique features of the PSID is that children of the 
original 4,802 sample members were retained in the sample after they left their parents’ 
households.1 This attribute allows one to follow a child over time thereby comparing the 
child’s economic circumstances in childhood to his/her economic wellbeing as an adult.  
We selected a sample of children born between 1967 and 1978 to the original 
sample members, and collected information on them between their birth and age nine and 
again from 2000 to 2008, when they were adults.2 We follow Ermish and Francesconi 
(2001) and assume that children reside with their mothers during their childhood. 
Therefore, using the Marital History Supplement in the PSID, we also track the marital 
                                                          
1 The PSID is composed of two independent samples. The first, called the Survey Research Center or SRC, sample 
is composed of a randomly drawn national sample, and the second, called the Survey of Economic Opportunities or 
SEO, is a group of low-income families. We use both sub-samples in our analyses, and weight responses by the 
individual weights provided. See Hill (1992) for more details on the PSID sample design.  
2 As detailed below, we used a number of selection criteria to create our analytic sample, which altered its 
composition slightly.  Please see the data appendix for more details. 
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history of each child’s mother beginning in the year of the child’s birth through the year of 
the child’s ninth birthday.3 Mothers are classified as always married, never married, 
married after the birth of the child, or married at the birth but subsequently experiencing a 
marital dissolution.  Those in the dissolution category include mothers who separated, 
divorced, or became a widow. Among this group, we further divided them into those who 
had a marital dissolution and remarried between the child’s birth and age nine and those 
who never remarried during that interval. 
 Table 1 provides information on our analytic sample. Eighty percent of the children 
had mothers who were continuously married throughout their first ten years. The mothers 
of 3.4 percent were never married and just over five percent married after the birth of their 
child. Of the mothers in the analytic sample, 11.4 percent were married when their child 
was born but experienced a dissolution during the next ten years.  This last set of mothers 
can be separated into those that remarry (3.6 percent of total sample) and those that never 
remarried (7.8 percent of total sample). 
 For each child, we estimate the child’s total family income at two points in time. 
First, we create a measure of the child’s “permanent income when a child,” which we define 
as the average of the total family income in each year between the child’s birth and ninth 
birthday. Total family income includes taxable income, such as earnings, interest, and 
dividends, and cash transfers, such as Social Security and welfare from all family members. 
All income figures are inflated to 2008 dollars using the CPI-U-X1 and the CPI-U-RS and are 
                                                          
3 Theoretically, one would prefer to investigate family structure throughout the period when a child resides with 
his/her parent(s). One could then determine if there are ages when single parenthood is particularly impactful. We 
are constrained to some extent by the fact that we want to measure the family income both when the child was 
young and when the child became an adult, and the length of the panel is limited. We believe we have captured the 
period in a child’s life that is most likely influenced by family structure. Ermish and Francesconi (2001) show that it 
is the family structure early in a child’s life that is most highly correlated with adverse outcomes. 
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based on the mother’s family. We measure permanent income in childhood using the 
average of family income over the first ten years of the child’s life because the research 
literature has shown that annual measures of income have considerable year-to-year 
variation due to the transitory component of income (Corak 2001; Mayer and Lopoo 2008; 
Solon 1992). Moreover, we look at the first 10 years because these are the ages when the 
parents are making decisions regarding the child’s early human capital formation. The 
mother must have at least three years of income to remain in the sample.  
We estimate the child’s permanent income as an adult as the average of the total 
family income for the child between 2000 and 2008, a period when the child has reached 
adulthood (and potentially is investing in his/her children). We require that the child have 
three years of income during that period before retaining the child in the analytic sample. 
Because the children in our sample are of different ages over this period, we flexibly 
control for child’s age in all analyses using this measure.  
 In addition to reporting total family income, we also use a family income measure 
adjusted for the size of the family. We follow the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
methodology and divide the total family income for the child by the square root of the 
family size for each year (see CBO 2009).  We then take the mean of family income adjusted 
for family size.  The square root of family size is used to allow for the economies of scale 
present in a family. Table 1 shows that the mean annual income for these children during 
the first ten years was $60,315 and the median was $54,870. Adjusted for family size, the 
mean family income was $29,684 and the median was $27,269. Once the children became 
adults, the mean annual income was $81,256 and the median was $69,102.  Once adjusted 
for family size the mean income was $50,630 and the median was $42,124. 
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Empirical Strategy 
Family Income in Childhood 
We begin our analyses by comparing the results from children who resided with mothers 
who were continuously married throughout the child’s formative years to children whose 
mothers were not, a group we classify as single mothers. This simple definition is one that 
has been used in several analyses in the past. To gain greater insight into the heterogeneity 
among single mother families, we also report results splitting the single mother group into 
those who were never married, those who were not married at the child’s birth, but 
subsequently married, and those who were married at the child’s birth but later 
experienced a marital dissolution. Mothers who experience a dissolution do not necessarily 
remain single; therefore, we will further separate the last group into those who remarried 
during the child’s first ten years and those that did not remarry during the ten years. 
 In our analysis of the relationship between family structure and permanent income 
during childhood, we first estimate the following descriptive model: 
1)  𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖, 
where Y represents the permanent income during childhood for child i and FS represents 
the family structure for the child during his/her first ten years. If we simply define FS as an 
indicator variable equal to one if the mother is a single parent, then α0 is the permanent 
income for children who resided with parents who were always married, and α1 is the 
difference in the permanent income for those who resided with single parents at some 
point during their first decade. We also report estimates with the more elaborate 
specification for family structure described above. 
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 In addition to these descriptive findings comparing the permanent income of the 
child during childhood by family structure, we also estimate models that include several 
demographic controls, including an indicator variable if the child is female, two indicator 
variables for the child’s race (African American and other non-White), and a linear and 
quadratic term for the mother’s age averaged over the years in which total family income 
was measured. We also include a variable for the age of the mother when she had her first 
child. Research consistently shows that young maternal age is positively associated with 
low socioeconomic status (Geronimus 1987; Geronimus and Korenman 1992). We also 
control for the socioeconomic status of the family using a set of indicator variables for the 
mother’s education level. This set of mutually exclusive variables includes an indicator set 
to one if the mother did not complete high school, a second if her highest educational 
attainment was high school completion, and a third if she completed some college. The 
omitted category is mothers who completed college (and higher levels of education).  
 The results for equation 1 are potentially biased due to the same selection issues 
that plague virtually all of the family structure literature. One might reasonably ask if the 
mothers whose marriages dissolve have different levels of permanent income because of 
the dissolution and the loss of a coresident adult in the labor force, or if those with low-
levels of income are more likely to experience dissolution. The permanent income measure 
and the mother’s family structure are measured during the same interval making it 
impossible to determine the causal direction. Furthermore, it is well understood that single 
parents are quite different from parents who are always married in many ways other than 
their family structure.  
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To remove some of the biases present in this first set of results, we make several 
modifications in subsequent analyses. First, we use a more homogeneous group of families 
than those in the complete analytic sample. More specifically, were retain only the mothers 
who were married at the birth of the child. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for several 
variables by family structure type. The mothers who were always married and those who 
experienced marital dissolution are more similar in terms of observable characteristics to 
one another than those who were never married or who married after the birth of the 
child, although they are far from homogeneous. It is likely, therefore, that they are also 
more similar in terms of unobservables. For instance, just over 8 percent of the children of 
continuously married mothers, 9.5 percent among the children of mothers who 
experienced dissolution and remarried, and 23.8 percent of the children of parents who 
experienced a dissolution and did not remarry were African American.  Compare these 
numbers to 80 percent of those who were never married and 41 percent of those who 
married after the birth who are African American. One observes similar differences in 
terms of education. Among the always married mothers, 16.2 percent had a college 
education, while nearly 20 percent of the children of mothers who remarried and 18 
percent of the mothers who had a marital dissolution without remarriage completed 
college.  In contrast, only 2.6 percent of the mothers who never-married and 1.6 percent of 
the mothers who married after birth completed college. While there is still considerable 
variation among the mothers who were married at the birth of the child, by using a more 
homogeneous comparison, we hope to remove some of the biases created by unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
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We also use a difference model to ask if the mean total family income before the 
dissolution occurred is different from the mean total family income after the dissolution. 
Naturally, one should expect the total family income to increase as the workers in a family 
gain greater experience and their earnings increase. To provide a baseline comparison, i.e., 
to define what is a reasonable change in income over time, we utilize the results from the 
always married group. To create this counterfactual change among the always married 
group, one that clearly never experienced dissolution, we compare the mean income in the 
first six years of the child’s life to the mean income in the last four. We chose year six as the 
dividing point since the median year that a dissolution occurred (among those who 
experienced it) was the sixth year.  We also remove the influence of time invariant factors 
by estimating a difference model.  Using the set of mothers who were married in the year 
their child was born, we estimate the change in the mean income as a function of the family 
structure of the child. Consider equation 2a: 
2a)  𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐴𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,  
where t =1 in the period before dissolution and t = 2, post-dissolution. Each observation 
has a family specific fixed effect, ε, which is correlated to family structure. We do not 
include a constant; therefore, all of the parameter estimates represent mean values for the 
individual family structure categories. If one subtracts the income level in the post period 
from pre period, one generates the following difference model:  
2b)        ∆𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽1∆𝐴𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽2∆𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽3∆𝑁𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖 + 𝛥𝑢𝑖 , 
where ΔY represents the difference in mean income before and after the dissolution, ∆𝐴𝑀 
represents the artificial change we created before and after the sixth year of marriage, and 
∆𝑅𝑒𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∆𝑁𝑅𝑒𝑚 are changes in the marital status of the mothers. Because all of the 
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mothers started the period married, these changes all represent changes to a nonmarried 
state. The benefit of this difference model is that factors that are constant within the 10-
year interval, such as the mother’s socioeconomic status, preferences for a large family, 
marriage, or work, (i.e., ε) are differenced out.  In other words, mother specific factors that 
are constant within the interval, whether observed or not, are not the explanation for any 
differences observed. 
 
Family Income in Adulthood 
In our second set of analytic models, we estimate the relationship between family structure 
in the child’s first decade and the child’s educational attainment and permanent income as 
an adult (described in equation 3). While we do not interpret our results as causal, they 
should not suffer from simultaneity bias given the lag between the family structure 
measure and the child’s economic status. 
3)    𝑌𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐹𝑆𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖  
We estimate the relationship between the child’s family structure and the child’s 
educational attainment measured as the maximum number of years completed between 
2000 and 2008 and the child’s permanent family income as an adult. In addition to the 
specification described in equation 3, we add controls for the sex of the child, the child’s 
race, a linear and quadratic term for the mother’s age when her income was measured, a 
linear and quadratic term for the child’s age when the child’s education and income was 
measured, the mother’s age at first birth, and the same set of maternal education indicator 
variables used in the first model.  
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 We also report results comparing the education and permanent family income 
measures using variation in family structure for siblings. The advantage of these within 
mother or family fixed effects models is that any factor that is constant across siblings, such 
as the home environment or school quality, does not bias estimates of the family structure 
effect. The utility of these family fixed effects models depends on several factors, however. 
First, in order to identify family structure effects, one needs both a large sample of siblings 
and variation in both the family structure and the outcome. Second, one has to assume that 
individual specific characteristics of the child are not causally related to the changes in 
family structure observed.  For instance, if families with children who suffer from 
developmental disabilities are more likely to divorce, the different level of permanent 
income observed for a child with the developmental disability (once an adult) and his/her 
sibling without the disability should be attributed to the disability not family structure. 
Third and finally, under most circumstances a decision to divorce or separate is the 
culmination of a long process in which the couple (or a spouse within the couple) decides 
to dissolve the marriage. While we know the date the marriage legally ended, the instability 
of the couple, the stress from the breaking relationship, as well as a number of other factors 
could affect children for several years before the actual split. If true, while the siblings may 
literally live in different family structures during their first ten years, they may have 
experienced very similar circumstances.  For example, a child whose mother who divorces 
when he is 11 would be, in our measure, classified as having an always married mother. His 
sibling who is three years younger would be classified as having a mother who had a 
marital dissolution. However, if the process of and stress associated with dissolution began 
many years prior to the dissolution, the actual differences in the experiences of the two 
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siblings may not be large. Given these caveats, we treat the family fixed effects models as 
robustness checks on the results we find with the OLS models. 
For all of the aforementioned analyses, we report results using both the permanent 
family income and results using permanent family income adjusted for the size of the 
family. All of the models are also estimated using the individual weights provided by the 
PSID. In models with controls, we demean the control variables to give the constant an 
interpretation that is relevant for our purposes. We report Huber White standard errors 
and because multiple children from the same family are present in the analytic sample, we 
adjust the standard errors to allow for dependence in the error term within the same 
families. 
 
Results 
Family Structure and Economic Resources during Childhood 
Table 3 shows descriptive results illustrating the relationship between the child’s family 
structure during his/her youth and the parent’s total family income. Model 1 suggests that 
children whose mothers were not continuously married have incomes that are $22,000 less 
than the children of mothers who were continuously married. Given that always married 
families earned about $64,700 annually, single parents have total family incomes that are 
about 2/3 the size of always married couples’ incomes. Model 2 breaks the family structure 
up into never married, married after birth, those that experienced dissolution and 
remarried and those that experienced a dissolution and did not remarry (the omitted group 
is always married). This disaggregation shows that there are differences in the economic 
wellbeing of families with different family structures. Compared to those that were always 
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married, those who were never married earned about $43,000 less. Those who were not 
married at the birth but later married, earned around $27,400 less. When we break marital 
dissolution into those mothers who remarried and those who did not, we find a result that 
will surface repeatedly throughout our analyses: among those who experience dissolution, 
there is a different level of family resources that depends on whether the mother 
remarried. Mothers who remarry earn about $4,000 less than those who were always 
married, but this difference is not statistically significant. On the other hand, those who do 
not remarry have permanent income levels that are more than $18,000 less than the 
always married, and this difference is statistically significant. In Model 3, we control for 
demographic factors, and we still observe statistically significant differences for never 
married mothers, mothers who marry after the birth and married mothers who break up 
and never remarry. The children of mothers who remarry have nearly identical permanent 
income levels suggesting that remarriage protects children from experiencing potential 
parental investment levels that are noticeably different from always married families. In 
Model 4, with the mother’s education level controlled, the mothers who marry after birth 
and the married mothers who break up and never remarry are different from the mothers 
who were always married.  The other two single mother categories are not different 
statistically.  
We find nearly identical results in Table 4 when we make an adjustment for the size 
of the family. We will walk through the results in Table 4, but since the results are 
substantively the same when one makes family size adjustments as when we use total 
family income, we focus on total family income results throughout the remainder of this 
paper. In Model 1, we find that single parents earn approximately $9,400 less than married 
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parents once the income is adjusted for family size, or about 30 percent less. Model 2 
breaks the single parent category up into more specific family structures. Never married 
families earn about $20,700 less than always married parents, while those who married 
after the birth earn about $12,500 less. Those who remarry earn about $1,900 more than 
the always married families, although this difference is not statistically significant. Those 
who do not remarry earn about $7,800 less than the always married group. One can explain 
a great deal of the differences noted among never married mothers with demographic 
controls and the mother’s education level. The difference for the children of never married 
mothers declines from $20,700 to around $7,000 with these factors controlled. In addition, 
the children of mothers who married after birth do not have a statistically significant 
difference in their permanent income nor do the children who have parents who dissolve 
and remarry.  The children of mothers who experience dissolution and do not remarry 
however, have lower permanent income adjusted for family size during their childhood – 
about $6,200 less than those who are always married. In sum, the children of mothers who 
never marry and who are married at their birth but subsequently break up and do not 
remarry are the children who experience economic circumstances that are noticeably 
different from the children of mothers who are continuously married. 
 In Table 5, we remove mothers who were not married in the year their child was 
born. In this set of results, we compare the incomes of the child before the dissolution to 
the income after the dissolution, again artificially breaking-up the continuously married 
couples to provide a baseline for a reasonable change over time. This model has the 
additional benefit of removing time-invariant factors for the children that may be biasing 
the family structure estimates.  The first column report results for total family income.   
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 Married couples earn about $12,300 more annually in the last four years of the 
child’s formative years than during the first six.  Those who remarried earned about 
$21,100 more after the dissolution.  While both estimates are statistically significantly 
different from zero, the difference between the coefficient estimates is not statistically 
significant. Those who never remarried earned about $13,500 less after the dissolution 
than before, and this result is statistically significantly different from the results for the 
always married families.  In other words, not only do the children of mothers who 
experience a dissolution and do not remarry do worse than the children of continuously 
married parents whose dissolution was artificially generated, they are worse off than they 
were before the dissolution.  Clearly, remarriage appears to be protective, while dissolution 
without remarriage substantially lowers the economic well-being of children.  
We interpret this set of results to suggest that marital dissolution in and of itself 
does not reduce the economic resources available to children: those who remarry after 
dissolution are not different in terms of their permanent income than those who are always 
married. In fact, they may be better off than those who are always married. However, the 
children of parents whose marriages dissolve and who do not remarry, experience large 
declines in their permanent income. This may be attributed to dissolution coupled with 
some personal or environmental characteristics or simply due to omitted factors from the 
model, i.e., selection.  What we can say is that dissolution itself is not the explanation.  
 
Family Structure and the Economic Wellbeing of the Child as an Adult 
Next, we ask if the family structure differences persist into adulthood. In Table 6, we 
estimate the relationship between family structure and the child’s educational attainment, 
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measured once the child is an adult. The children of single parents earn 0.8 years less 
education than the children of always married parents, who earned 14 years on average. 
Model 2 shows that, as was the case for parental income, aggregating all of the single 
parents hides the differences that exist across difference family structures. For instance, 
the children of mothers who were never married earned 1.6 years less than the children of 
mothers who were always married, while the children of the mothers that married after 
birth the birth of the child earned about 1.1 years less.  The children of parents who 
experienced dissolution and remarried have nearly identical education levels as the 
children of continuously married mothers.  The children of dissolution without remarriage 
earned about 0.7 years less, and that difference is statistically significant. In Model 3, we 
include controls for demographic factors, and the differences for those who never married 
and those who married after birth are reduced appreciably. The difference for never 
married mothers declines to about two-thirds of the previous estimated mean difference, 
and the difference for children of mothers who married after the birth declines to about 
one-third of the previous mean difference. In Model 4, we control for the mother’s 
education level, and all of the differences decline again, with the exception for the 
difference for the dissolution with remarriage group, and this is the only family structure 
type that has a statistically significantly difference compared to the children of 
continuously married mothers. In Model 5, we include a measure of the child’s permanent 
family income to test if the remaining educational difference for this family structure group 
can be explained by the permanent family income differences.  While the coefficient 
estimate falls, the difference persists and remains statistically significant, suggesting that 
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the educational differences observed are due to factors other than those generated by 
difference in potential parental investment. 
 In Table 7, we report results for the permanent income of the child as an adult, and 
in Table 8, we report estimates for adjusted family income. We focus on the results in Table 
7 since the two sets are similar. Model 1 shows that the children of single parents earn 
$28,200 less than the children of always married parents, who earn $86,900 on average. 
Again, these difference are not equal across family structure types. Models 2 reveals that 
the children of mothers who were never married earn $46,000 less than the children of 
continuously married mothers, while the children of those who marry after birth earn 
$34,500 less.  As was the case for income during childhood, there are interesting 
differences among the children of dissolution that differ by the remarriage status of the 
child’s mother.  The children of mothers who remarried earn roughly the same amount as 
the children of always married parents, while the children of mothers who do not remarry 
earn $30,500 less, a statistically significant difference.  Demographic factors explain a large 
portion of the differences observed.  The difference for never married mothers falls (in 
magnitude) from -$46,000 to around -$16,900.  The difference for those married after the 
birth of the child falls from -$34,000 to -$14,600 and is no longer statistically significant. 
The difference for the dissolved but never remarried group declines (in magnitude) from  
-$30,500 to -$24,500. In Model 4, we add controls for the mother’s education and the only 
statistically significant difference is for those who experience dissolution and do not 
remarry. The estimated difference remains around -$24,200. The never married difference 
drops in magnitude to -$10,900, and the difference for the married after birth group falls to 
-$12,400. When we include the education variable as a mechanism to explain potential 
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impact of family structure in Model 5, the difference for the never married group declines 
(in magnitude) again to -$4,300, the difference for the married after birth declines (in 
magnitude) to -$10,200, the difference for the remarried group increases to $5,041, and the 
difference for the never remarried group declines (in magnitude) about a third to -$16,900. 
This final difference is the only difference that is statistically significant. In Model 6, we add 
a measure of the permanent income of the child, which would capture all of the 
socioeconomic factors related to family structure outside of human capital accumulation. 
Once controlled, the coefficient estimate for dissolution and never remarrying falls (in 
magnitude) to -$9,500 but remains statistically significant. 
 We next turn to results from the family fixed effects models (FE) to test the 
robustness of our OLS findings. It is important to restate that the identification of the family 
structure coefficients in our family fixed effect model comes from variation among siblings 
that experienced different family structures during their first ten years. In our analytic 
sample, we had 369 families with siblings which translated into 822 individual 
observations. However, most of the siblings did not experience a different family structure 
during their first ten years. Table 9 provides more detail on family structure variation 
within siblings. The first row in Table 9 shows that four two-sibling families (eight siblings) 
and two three-sibling families (six siblings) had variation in the “never-married” family 
structure. Based on Table 9, there is very little family structure variation to identify the 
difference in economic wellbeing for the children of never-married mothers and those who 
were always married (n=14). The same is true of the mothers who remarry after divorce. 
While none of the family structure types had a considerable amount of within sibling 
variation, the married after birth and the dissolution and never remarried groups appear to 
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have relatively more. We focus our attention on the results for the dissolved and never 
remarried group since these are the results that were statistically significant in the OLS 
models, but again, we simply report these results as robustness checks to compare to the 
OLS results. 
 Table 10 reports results for the child’s educational attainment, and Tables 13 and 14 
show results from the family income and family income adjusted for family size, 
respectively. In Table 10, we report the OLS findings from Models 4 and 5 in Table 6, in 
addition to the results for the family fixed effects (FE) models. As expected, the coefficient 
estimates for the family fixed effects models are imprecisely measured.  However, the 
point-estimates are quite consistent for the dissolved and never remarried group in the 
OLS and fixed effects models. For instance, in Model 4, compared to those who are 
constantly married, the children of mothers who experience a marital dissolution without 
remarriage earn about 0.72 of a year less education. The point-estimate for the fixed effects 
models is 0.75 years less. Similarly, in Model 5, once the child’s permanent income during 
childhood is controlled, the point estimate in the OLS model is -0.54 compared to -0.59 in 
the fixed effects model.   
 Model 5 in Table 11 shows a difference for marital dissolution and never remarrying 
of around -$16,500 for both the OLS model and the FE model. The results for Model 6 are 
less consistent, showing greater disparity in the FE model compared to the OLS model, but 
both the FE results suggest that the difference may be even larger than predicted by the 
OLS results. The results for family income adjusted for size are qualitatively similar, and are 
reported in Table 12.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
Until recently, data have not been available to investigate the long-term consequences of 
single parenthood for children once they reach adulthood.  We use the PSID to determine 
whether the marital status of mothers during the first ten years of a child’s life affect that 
child’s economic well-being both in childhood and adulthood. Our results suggest the 
economic wellbeing of children who experience a maternal dissolution differs depending 
on the whether the mother remarries.  More specifically, the children whose mothers 
remarry appear to have, as a child, family incomes that are quite similar to the children 
who live with continuously married mothers. Children of mothers who never remarry 
appear to suffer economically. In fact, our results suggest that the children of continuously 
married mothers and mothers who remarry have an improved economic situation 
throughout their youth. In contrast, the children of mothers who do not remarry not only 
have worse economic conditions at birth compared to the children of continuously married 
parents, their economic wellbeing actually declines over time.  In other words, they are 
become worse off as they age. This finding is interesting in the context of the broader 
literature.  Duncan and Hoffman (1985) showed that marital dissolution is more harmful to 
women than men and that remarriage can protect women.  We find that this is particularly 
true for women with children and when one looks at their smoothed income rather than 
just looking at individual years.  Of course, one cannot be sure this difference among those 
who experience a dissolution is a remarriage effect. Mothers who experience a dissolution 
and remarry may be different from mothers who do not remarry in ways that we have not 
controlled. What this does suggest, however, is that dissolution, in and of itself, is not 
harmful to children.   
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If this remarriage difference is causal, the finding is of value to the broader 
literature on remarriage. Children who grow up with mothers who divorce and remarry do 
not fare as well on a variety of outcomes, including educational attainment and engaging in 
risky behaviors, on average as children who grow up with continuously married parents 
(Astone and McLanahan 1991; Coleman, Ganong, and Fine 2000; Hoffman and Johnson 
1998; Ribar 2004; Teachman Paasch, and Carver 1996). Our results suggest that these 
losses are probably not due to a reduction in parental resources: remarried families seem 
to have at least as much income as continuously married families, perhaps even more. One 
potential explanation for the poorer outcomes for the children of remarriage is the 
instability of a marital dissolution, where children may have to move into a different 
neighborhood with different peer networks and schools. Furthermore, the children may 
suffer from the stress of the break-up. Ribar (2004) also suggests that step-parents may not 
place the same value on their step-children, and invest in them less.  
Our findings also suggest that some of the difference persist into adulthood, but only 
for those who experience dissolution without remarriage; the children of remarriage have 
education and income levels that are comparable to the children of mothers who were 
always married. The children of mothers who experience a dissolution but who do not 
remarry earn about 0.7 less years of education. Once we control for the permanent income 
of the family during the child’s first ten years, the difference falls to 0.5 years, but remains 
statistically significant. Thus, the family structure differences may be partially explained by 
their economic well-being as a child, but other explanations must exist. Given that the 
children of remarriage had much smaller reductions in education (0.09 years and 
insignificant), then the common experiences with the children of remarriage, such as a 
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break-up with a biological parent, also are probably not the explanation for the observed 
differences.  Dissolution, in and of itself, then is probably not the source of the difference 
either, and selection remains a likely cause. We use family fixed effects models to check the 
robustness of our findings, and they are consistent with the 0.7 to 0.5 year reduction in 
education. If selection is the issue, then it is likely factors that are not constant within the 
family. 
 With respect to income as an adult, the findings for the children of mothers who 
experience dissolution also diverge conditional on a remarriage. The children of mothers 
who remarry, appear to earn at least as much as the children of continuously married 
mothers. Without remarriage, the children who experience dissolution earn about $17,000 
less annually in adulthood. Family fixed effects models show nearly identical results. Once 
we control for the permanent income of the child during their first ten years, dissolution 
without remarriage becomes less costly. The difference falls to around $9,500 suggesting 
that parental income as a child may have persistent effects. The family fixed effects model 
show much larger differences, but they are not precisely measured.  
 Our results show that family structure does appear to matter to the economic well-
being of children – both when growing up and as adults. Moreover, they suggest that 
dissolution in particular has the potential to be harmful. However, there is considerable 
heterogeneity in the effects of dissolution among these children. For example, children 
whose mothers remarry appear to experience relatively minimal impacts of their mother’s 
marital dissolution. Those whose mothers do not remarry appear to have large reductions 
in their economic wellbeing in childhood and a an adult.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Mothers and Children 
 
 Parent’s Generation Child’s Generation 
Family Income: Mean 
Family Income: [Median] 
Family Income: (Standard 
Deviation) 
60315 
[54870] 
(33844) 
81256 
[69102] 
(66789) 
Family Income Adjusted for 
Family Size 
 
29684 
[27269] 
(16396) 
50630 
[42124] 
(42040) 
Age 29.86 
(5.38) 
31.75 
(3.37) 
   
Always married 0.801  
Never married 0.034  
Married after birth 0.051  
Marital Dissolution 0.114  
  Never remarried 0.077  
  Remarried 0.037  
   
Female  0.496 
African American  0.136 
White  0.837 
Other  0.028 
   
Sample Size 1548 
Note: Authors’ calculations from the PSID. Incomes are inflated to 2008 dollars using the 
CPI-U-RS and CPI-U-X1. 
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Table 2: Total Family Income and Total Family Income Adjusted for Family Size for 
Parent and Children 
 
 Full 
Sample 
Always 
Married 
Never 
Married 
Married 
After Birth 
Marital 
Dissolution: 
Remarried 
Marital 
Dissolution: Never 
Remarried 
Family income 
(mother) 
60315 
[54870] 
(33844) 
64748 
[58684] 
(33424) 
21577 
[16961] 
(14809) 
37322 
[31028] 
(21002) 
60711 
[50204] 
(37679) 
46421 
[40350] 
(28244) 
Adjusted family 
income 
(mother) 
29684 
[27269] 
(16396) 
31558 
[28893] 
(16172) 
10870 
[8932] 
(7053) 
19050 
[17036] 
(11304) 
33439 
[27311] 
(20475) 
23769 
[21495] 
(12632) 
Family income 
(child) 
81256 
[69102] 
(66789) 
86886 
[73594] 
(69829) 
41195 
[32633] 
(33232) 
52381 
[45371] 
(49195) 
88092 
[70826] 
(64463) 
56352 
[51472] 
(32099) 
Adjusted family 
income (child) 
50630 
[42124] 
(42040) 
53880 
[44638] 
(43920) 
25593 
[18442] 
(22943) 
31413 
[29932] 
(28990) 
56953 
[42161] 
(40814) 
37647 
[33953] 
(22980) 
Child female 0.496 0.479 0.607 0.486 0.650 0.546 
Child African 
American 
0.136 0.081 0.796 0.428 0.095 0.238 
Child White 0.837 0.893 0.172 0.482 0.905 0.738 
Child other race 0.028 0.025 0.032 0.090 0 0.025 
Mother’s age 29.86 
(5.38) 
30.35 
(5.22) 
26.45 
(6.01) 
25.02 
(4.18) 
28.38 
(4.36) 
30.21 
(5.67) 
Child’s age 31.75 
(3.37) 
31.88 
(3.37) 
30.69 
(3.31) 
31.34 
(3.62) 
31.38 
(3.04) 
31.29 
(3.35) 
Mother < HS 0.154 0.126 0.575 0.328 0.042 0.208 
Mother HS 0.443 0.456 0.274 0.524 0.411 0.341 
Mother Some 
College 
0.250 0.256 0.124 0.132 0.350 0.271 
Mother College 
Grad + 
0.153 0.162 0.026 0.017 0.197 0.180 
Child < HS 0.100 0.092 0.285 0.138 0.033 0.102 
Child HS 0.255 0.224 0.410 0.384 0.358 0.379 
Child Some 
College 
0.312 0.319 0.178 0.346 0.254 0.304 
Child College 
Grad + 
0.333 0.366 0.127 0.131 0.355 0.215 
       
Sample size 1548 1129 113 126 54 126 
Note: Authors’ calculations from the PSID. Incomes are inflated to 2008 dollars using the CPI-U-RS and CPI-U-
X1.  
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Table 3: OLS Models of Family Structure and Family Income during Child’s Youth 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Single parent -22226** 
(2703) 
   
Never married  -43170** 
(2761) 
-21212** 
(3860) 
-16125** 
(3430) 
Married after birth  -27426** 
(3347) 
-7552* 
(3248) 
-5665 
(3136) 
Marital dissolution 
& remarried 
 -4037 
(6394) 
833 
(6142) 
-3111 
(5503) 
Marital dissolution 
& never remarried 
 -18327** 
(4105) 
-15490** 
(3233) 
-15424** 
(3117) 
Constant 64748** 
(1424) 
64748** 
(1426) 
62585** 
(1235) 
62457** 
(1177) 
Demo. No No Yes Yes 
Mother’s 
Education 
No No No Yes 
Sample size 1548 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered at family level. Models 
include indicator variables for the child’s sex and the child’s race. The models also include a 
linear and quadratic terms for the mother’s mean age when income was measured, and a 
measure of the mother’s age when she had her first child. Mother’s education includes a set 
of indicators for less than high school, high school, some college.  College or more is omitted 
category.  
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Table 4: OLS Models of Family Structure and Family Income Adjusted 
for Family Size during Child’s Youth 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Single parent -9394** 
(1366) 
   
Never 
married 
 -20688** 
(1362) 
-9565** 
(1880) 
-7005** 
(1718) 
Married after 
birth 
 -12508** 
(1847) 
-3338* 
(1642) 
-2399 
(1573) 
Marital 
dissolution & 
remarried 
 1881 
(3567) 
4236 
(3571) 
2250 
(3155) 
Marital 
dissolution & 
never 
remarried 
 -7789** 
(1786) 
-6204** 
(1341) 
-6171** 
(1258) 
Constant 31558** 
(684) 
31558** 
(684) 
30501** 
(593) 
30438** 
(563) 
Demo. No No Yes Yes 
Mother’s 
Education 
No No No Yes 
Sample size 1548 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered at family 
level. Models include indicator variables for the child’s sex and the child’s 
race. The models also include a linear and quadratic terms for the mother’s 
mean age when income was measured, and a measure of the mother’s age 
when she had her first child. Mother’s education includes a set of indicators 
for less than high school, high school, some college.  College or more is 
omitted category. 
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Table 5: Difference Model of Family Income Before and After Marital Dissolution, 
Sample of Mothers Married when Child Born 
 
 Sample Includes Continuously Married Mothers 
 Family Income Adjusted Family Income  
Always married 12324** 
(1009) 
4184** 
(465) 
Dissolution and remarried 21080** 
(6996) 
11890**# 
(3814) 
 
Dissolution and never remarried -13537**## 
(3577) 
-4811**## 
(1432) 
   
Sample size 1276 1276 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p < 0.01 for H0: Parameter = 0; 
# p<0.05; ## p < 0.01 for H0: Parameter different from Always Married Parameter; 
Robust standard errors clustered at family level. 
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Table 6: OLS Models of Family Structure and Child’s Educational 
Attainment 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Single 
parent 
-0.828** 
(0.178) 
    
Never 
married 
 -1.601** 
(0.343) 
-1.071** 
(0.393) 
-0.657 
(0.415) 
-0.471 
(0.409) 
Married 
after birth 
 -1.120** 
(0.298) 
-0.414 
(0.300) 
-0.257 
(0.282) 
-0.191 
(0.279) 
Marital 
dissolution 
& 
remarried 
 0.078 
(0.354) 
0.181 
(0.318) 
-0.126 
(0.303) 
-0.089 
(0.293) 
Marital 
dissolution 
& never 
remarried 
 -0.731** 
(0.269) 
-0.726** 
(0.247) 
-0.719** 
(0.210) 
-0.543** 
(0.213) 
Constant 14.01** 
(0.086) 
14.01** 
(0.086) 
13.95** 
(0.078) 
13.94** 
(0.075) 
13.91** 
(0.074) 
Demo. No No Yes Yes Yes 
Mother’s 
Education 
No No No Yes Yes 
Mother’s 
Permanent 
Income 
No No No No Yes 
Sample 
size 
1548 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered at family level. 
Models include indicator variables for the child’s sex and the child’s race. The 
models also include a linear and quadratic terms for the mother’s mean age 
when income was measured, a linear and quadratic term for the child’s age 
when education was measured, and a measure of the mother’s age when she 
had her first child.  Mother’s education includes a set of indicators for less 
than high school, high school, some college.  College or more is omitted 
category. 
 
  
37 
 
 
Table 7: OLS Models of Family Structure and Child’s Family Income during 
Adulthood 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Single parent -28228** 
(4374) 
     
Never married  -45961** 
(6756) 
-16905* 
(8154) 
-10923 
(7790) 
-4347 
(7728) 
3714 
(8191) 
Married after birth  -34506** 
(7399) 
-14587 
(8200) 
-12361 
(8068) 
-10204 
(7679) 
-7300 
(7313) 
Marital dissolution 
& remarried 
 1205 
(11249) 
6056 
(10939) 
2075 
(10886) 
5041 
(11316) 
6544 
(11333) 
Marital dissolution 
& never remarried 
 -30534** 
(4686) 
-24501** 
(4515) 
-24175** 
(4407) 
-16925** 
(4117) 
-9461* 
(4772) 
Constant 86886** 
(2746) 
86886** 
(2749) 
84244** 
(2446) 
84050** 
(2426) 
83047** 
(2207) 
81993** 
(2012) 
Demo. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mother’s Education No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Child’s Education No No No No Yes Yes 
Mother’s 
Permanent Income 
No No No No No Yes 
Sample size 1548 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered at family level. Models include 
indicator variables for the child’s sex and the child’s race. The models also include a linear and 
quadratic terms for the mother’s mean age when income was measured, a linear and quadratic 
term for the child’s age when the child’s total family income was measured, and a measure of 
the mother’s age when she had her first child. Mother’s education includes a set of indicators for 
less than high school, high school, some college.  College or more is omitted category. The child’s 
education includes the same education categories. 
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Table 8: OLS Models of Family Structure and Child’s Family 
Income Adjusted for Family Size during Adulthood 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Single parent -16294** 
(2877) 
     
Never 
married 
 -28287** 
(4737) 
-10395 
(5503) 
-6628 
(5247) 
-2402 
(5095) 
2278 
(5269) 
Married after 
birth 
 -22467** 
(4437) 
-9883* 
(4973) 
-8343 
(4881) 
-6836 
(4583) 
-5150 
(4341) 
Marital 
dissolution & 
remarried 
 3073 
(7788) 
7412 
(7957) 
4533 
(7559) 
6493 
(7781) 
7366 
(7518) 
Marital 
dissolution & 
never 
remarried 
 -16233** 
(3271) 
-12672** 
(3156) 
-12658** 
(3025) 
-7711** 
(2651) 
-3377 
(2875) 
Constant 53880** 
(1703) 
53880** 
(1705) 
52193** 
(1501) 
52092** 
(1495) 
51417** 
(1346) 
50806** 
(1257) 
Demo. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mother’s 
Education 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Child’s 
Education 
No No No No Yes Yes 
Mother’s 
Permanent 
Income 
No No No No No Yes 
       
Sample Size 1548 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered at family level. Models 
include indicator variables for the child’s sex and the child’s race. The models also 
include a linear and quadratic terms for the mother’s mean age when income was 
measured, a linear and quadratic term for the child’s age when the child’s total family 
income was measured, and a measure of the mother’s age when she had her first 
child. Mother’s education includes a set of indicators for less than high school, high 
school, some college.  College or more is omitted category. The child’s education 
includes the same education categories. 
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Table 9: Sample Size for Families with Siblings and for Families with Siblings 
with Variation by Family Structure 
 
Observations: Families with Family 
Structure Variation 
Number of Siblings in the Family 
 Two Three Four Five Total 
Never married 8 6 0 0 14 
Married after birth 36 18 4 0 58 
Divorced and remarried 12 9 0 0 21 
Divorced and never remarried 38 12 4 0 54 
Total 94 45 8 0 147 
      
Total Number of Families      
Total in Sample 586 207 24 5 822 
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Table 10: Comparison of OLS and Mother Fixed Effects Models, Child’s Educational 
Attainment 
 Model 4 Model 5 
 OLS FE OLS FE 
Never married -0.657 
(0.415) 
-0.460 
(0.850) 
-0.471 
(0.409) 
-0.269 
(0.820) 
Married after birth -0.257 
(0.282) 
0.255 
(0.590) 
-0.191 
(0.279) 
0.219 
(0.595) 
Marital dissolution & 
remarried 
-0.126 
(0.303) 
0.120 
(0.981) 
-0.089 
(0.293) 
0.325 
(1.007) 
Marital dissolution & 
never remarried 
-0.719** 
(0.210) 
-0.754 
(0.879) 
-0.543** 
(0.213) 
-0.592 
(0.855) 
     
Demographics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mother’s permanent 
income 
No No Yes Yes 
Sample Size 1548 822 1548 822 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered at family level. Models 
include indicator variables for the child’s sex and the child’s race. The models also include a 
linear and quadratic terms for the mother’s mean age when income was measured, a linear 
and quadratic term for the child’s age when the child’s education was measured, and a 
measure of the mother’s age when she had her first child.  Mother’s education includes a set 
of indicators for less than high school, high school, some college.  College or more is omitted 
category.  
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Table 11: Comparison of OLS Models and Mother Fixed Effects Models of Child’s 
Family Income during Adulthood 
 Model 5  Model 6 
 OLS FE OLS FE 
Never married -4347 
(7728) 
-36880 
(20699) 
3714 
(8191) 
-40643* 
(19450) 
Married after birth -10204 
(7679) 
-12505 
(9562) 
-7300 
(7313) 
-11764 
(9683) 
Marital dissolution & remarried 5041 
(11316) 
15724 
(26060) 
6544 
(11333) 
11286 
(25319) 
Marital dissolution & never remarried -16925** 
(4117) 
-16386 
(20091) 
-9461* 
(4772) 
-19548 
(19208) 
     
Demographics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Child’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mother’s permanent income No No Yes Yes 
Sample Size 1550 822 1550 822 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered at family level. Models include indicator 
variables for the child’s sex and the child’s race. The models also include a linear and quadratic terms for the 
mother’s mean age when income was measured, a linear and quadratic term for the child’s age when the 
child’s total family income was measured, and a measure of the mother’s age when she had her first child. 
Mother’s education includes a set of indicators for less than high school, high school, some college.  College or 
more is omitted category. The child’s education includes the same categories. 
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Table 12: Comparison of OLS Models and Mother Fixed Effects Models of Child’s 
Family Income Adjusted for Family Size 
 Model 6 Model 7 
 OLS FE OLS FE 
Never married -2402 
(5095) 
-30190** 
(11513) 
2278 
(5269) 
-30673** 
(11040) 
Married after birth -6836 
(4583) 
-5961 
(5515) 
-5150 
(4341) 
-5894 
(5535) 
Marital dissolution & 
remarried 
6493 
(7781) 
11081 
(12670) 
7366 
(7518) 
10334 
(12401) 
Marital dissolution & never 
remarried 
-7711** 
(2651) 
-9679 
(10530) 
-3377 
(2875) 
-10237 
(10096) 
     
Demographics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Child’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mother’s permanent income No No Yes Yes 
Sample Size 1548 822 1548 822 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered at family level. Models 
include indicator variables for the child’s sex and the child’s race. The models also include a 
linear and quadratic terms for the mother’s mean age when income was measured, a linear 
and quadratic term for the child’s age when the child’s total family income was measured, 
and a measure of the mother’s age when she had her first child. Mother’s education 
includes a set of indicators for less than high school, high school, some college.  College or 
more is omitted category. The child’s education includes the same categories. 
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Data Appendix 
 
The 1,548 cases that were included in the PSID analytic sample met some fairly rigid data 
requirements.  The child’s mother’s marital history needed to be complete for the child’s 
first ten years, the child needed at least three years of total family income reported 
between 2000 and 2008, and the child’s mother needed at least three years of total family 
income reported during the child’s first ten years. The variable for the child’s family size 
during his/her youth and during his/her adulthood also had to be non-missing in the years 
income was reported. Furthermore, the child’s education variable between 2000 and 2008 
had to be non-missing for at least one year. Given these selection criteria, the 1,548 
children used in the analytic sample is much smaller than the full sample of children born 
between 1967 and 1978.  Below, we compare the demographic characteristics (that were 
never missing) for the 1,548 child used in the analysis to the 2,217 children born between 
1967 and 1978 who had individual sample weights, i.e., the full sample of children in the 
PSID who could have been used with complete data. 
 
 Analytic Sample Full Sample Cases not used 
Child is female 0.496 
(0.500) 
0.476 
(0.500) 
0.417** 
(0.493) 
Child is African 
American 
0.136 
(0.342) 
0.149 
(0.356) 
0.192** 
(0.394) 
Child is white 0.837 
(0.370) 
0.824 
(0.380) 
0.785** 
(0.411) 
Child is other race 0.028 
(0.164) 
0.027 
(0.161) 
0.023 
(0.151) 
Year born 1972.33 
(3.46) 
1972.55 
(3.51) 
1973.20** 
(3.58) 
    
 1548 2217 669 
Notes: ** p < 0.01; t-test for difference between proportion in analytic sample and 
proportion among cases not used in the analysis. 
 
Results suggest that the cases that were lost for this analysis were not random. The 
individuals lost to this analysis were less likely to be female, were more likely to be African 
American, and were slightly younger than those in the analytic sample. Readers should 
keep this in mind when interpreting results. 
 
